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Abstract: South Africa is regarded as one of the most unequal societies in the world. Apartheid 
engineered a population with vast inequalities across racial groups. The nature of this inequality was 
primarily racially based. The political and economic trajectory of the last twenty years has somewhat 
changed the nature and composition of this kind of inequality but fundamental continuity of deep 
inequality is still somehow maintained. The post-apartheid distributional regime continues to divide 
South Africans into insiders and outsiders. Although the political pattern is still largely racially based, a 
new political landscape is beginning to emerge which is based on the complexity of class and race 
entanglements. The rising inequality within the black community is becoming a cause for concern for the 
continuation of the present developmental trajectory.  It has created a fertile ground for the rise of 
populist movements and demagogues that will seek to take advantage of those neglected by the state 
machinery. This paper will seek to explore the links between inequality and economic growth and 
political conflict by tracing the origins of income inequality in South Africa, its evolution after the 
democratic transition in 1994; and its economic and political implications. 
 




South Africa is one of the most economically and socially polarised societies in the world. The transition 
to democracy in 1994 raised the hopes of the majority of the population for a better life. The democratic 
government had a mandate to transform the economic inequalities and social stratification according to 
race that were engineered by the apartheid government. After twenty years of democratic dispensation, 
the statistics are not impressive by any standard. Although huge strides have been made in terms of 
service delivery, such as housing, household electrification, health, water and sanitation, and the 
transformation of the public sector employment profile, there are still evident challenges in term of 
employment creation and access to education for the majority of those who were systematically excluded 
from the economic benefits by the apartheid government. The menaces that huge disparities of income 
and wealth pose on social and economic stability are well-documented. An extensive literature in 
economics and social sciences has explored the relationship between income inequality and economic 
growth, and a range of social phenomena. This paper will seek to explore the links between inequality and 
economic growth and political conflict by tracing the origins of income inequality in South Africa, its 
evolution after the democratic transition in 1994; and its economic and political implications. Section 2 
gives a historical background of inequality in South Africa, beginning with the establishment of the 
shipping outpost by the Dutch in 1652. Section 3 explores the evolution of inequality after 1994. Section 4 
and 5 tackle the economic implications of inequality and economic performance of South Africa since 
1994 respectively. Section 6 analyses the relationship between income inequality and political stability. 
Finally, section 7 scrutinizes the phenomenon and rise of the so-called “service delivery protests,” 
especially after the 2004 democratic elections.  
 
Historical background of inequality in South Africa: Inequality in South Africa is entrenched in 
military defeat and political exclusion, which took a colonial and racial form, and was reinforced by 
continuing repression of political and social organisation (Gelb, 2003). Conquest began with the setting 
up of a Dutch shipping outpost on the southern tip of Africa in the 1650s, which developed into the city of 
Cape Town. In the next two centuries, there was gradual expansion inland by the Dutch and then the 
British (who took over in the early nineteenth century), and conquered indigenous groups were not fully 
integrated into colonial and settler societies, retaining considerable economic autonomy (de Kiewiet, 
1957). The determination for political control of the region hastened sharply after mineral deposits were 
discovered – diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1887 – and demand for unskilled labour rose (Plaatjie, 1916; 
de Kiewiet, 1957; Carter, 1977). In the beginning of the twentieth century, contemporary South Africa and 
most of the neighbouring countries were consolidated under British imperial control. Conquest climaxed 
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in the defeat of the Boer settler republics in 1902 (Geen, 1946; Keppel-Jones, 1949). The peace settlement 
carved racial discrimination in the foundations of new South African state constituted in 1910 from the 
British colonies of the Cape and Natal and the Boer republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State 
(Tingsten, 1955).  
 
According to Kirk (1929) conquest and political exclusion were the ‘initial conditions’ determining black 
peoples’ unequal access to resources, their potential for asset accumulation, and the returns from their 
assets. Inequality was entrenched by the pattern of economic growth and development after the mineral 
discoveries. The forced labour regime in mining established the migrant system and provided the 
foundation for racial discrimination in the labour market and in the workplace as the secondary and 
tertiary sectors developed (Plaatjie, 1916; Tinley, 1942; Gibbs, 1954). MacMillan (1930) states that the 
mineral surpluses were increasingly funnelled to domestic industrial growth (rather than remitted 
abroad) from the First World War after manufacturing import substitution was boosted by shipping 
restrictions. In the 1920s, manufacturing development was the focus of policy: tariff barriers were 
introduced, large-scale iron and steel and energy works were established by the state to supply the mines, 
and foreign multinationals entered, seeking consumer goods markets amongst the white population (de 
Kiewiet, 1941). The domestic output of labour-intensive consumer goods hastened after 1933, when 
currency depreciation due to international gold standard’s collapse, and shipping disruptions during the 
Second World War, each provided effective trade barriers (Gibb, 1954). 
 
After 1945, growth was directed by the expansion of capital-intensive production for the domestic market 
of consumer durables (autos, electronics) and heavy intermediate goods. In contrast to the East Asian 
economies where labour-intensive export-promotion contributed to higher employment rates and 
greater equality, South Africa (like other primary commodity exporters like Brazil and Argentina) opted 
for a domestic market focus on reaching the end of the first ‘easy’ phase of import substitution (Gelb, 
2003). According to de Kiewiet (1957) this strategy was concomitant with building domestic political 
support amongst the urban middle class and skilled industrial workers, that is, the urban white 
population. Raising white living standards implied a widening racial gap, aggravated by increasing 
capital-intensity and limited labour absorption, raising black unemployment from the late 1960s (Ross, 
1999; Aliber, 2003; Kingdon & Knight, 2004). 
 
The Native Land Act of 1913 restricted land ownership for Africans to certain demarcated areas mostly in 
the north and east, initially about 8% of the country’s land area but extended to about 13% in the 1936 
Native Land Act (de Kiewiet, 1941; Geen, 1946; Keppel-Jones, 1949;  Marquad, 1950; Gibbs, 1954). The 
balkanised ‘reserves’ thus demarcated by the legislation laid the foundation for the ‘bantustan’ system, in 
which the rights of political representation for Africans were attached to these areas (Marquad, 1952). 
Many Africans continued to live in rural areas reserved for whites, as tenants and labourers on white 
farms but also on their own land. From the 1960s, the government accelerated forced removals, moving 
nearly half a million people, but the attempt to move all Africans into the ‘bantustans’ did not succeed. In 
the urban areas, the Group Areas Act of 1950 circumscribed property ownership rights to specified areas 
for Africans, as well as for Coloureds and Indians (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005). Together with the migrant 
labour system restricting Africans’ movement into the urban areas, this contributed to severe housing 
shortages in the cities, and also prevented home ownership for Africans and curtailed collateral available 
for loans (Ross, 1999; Aliber, 2003). 
 
2. The post-apartheid evolution of inequality in South Africa 
 
Although the end of the apartheid regime is a turning point in South African history, it is challenging to 
study the differences in income inequality before and after apartheid due to the almost complete lack of 
comparable data sources. One of the few surveys that allow the calculation of inequality measures before 
the end of apartheid is the 1993 Living Standards Measurement Survey. Based on its data, the Gini index 
of South Africa’s per capita income distribution was estimated to be 0.623 in 1993 (Leite, McKingley & 
Osorio 2006). Two years later, in 1995 another survey permits us to estimate that the Gini index was 
0.648 (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005). This represents a 3.2 per cent increase in the Gini index over two 
years. Five years later, in 2000, the Gini was estimated to be 0.673, representing as overall increase of 8.1 
per cent from 1993 to 2000 (Lam & Liebbrandt, 2004). Despite the likelihood of glitches in the data (since 
the data sources are not comparable and there are unavoidable measurement errors and biases), these 




In addition to the high level of income inequality in South Africa, there are also large inequalities in the 
non-economic dimensions of human development. This condition is highlighted by the Human 
Development Index of South Africa, which was 0.658 in 2003, ranking it 120th among the 177 countries 
for which the HDI was estimated (UNDP, 2005). In addition to this generalised and multi-dimensional 
inequality, one should highlight the large component of between-group inequality by race. Although 
poverty and inequality increased during the 1995-2000 period, South Africa has made remarkable 
progress since 1994 in other dimensions of human well-being (Carter & May, 2001; van der Berg, Burger, 
Louw, & Yu 2005). Many of the social indicators of the country have performed better than those related 
to income, particularly with regard to access to public services. This has been due mainly to reordering of 
budgetary resources to promote education, health, social security and housing in poorer areas, where 
most African households dwell (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005). The number of households with access to 
piped water, sanitation and electricity has increased substantially. However, such gains in well-being 
have not succeeded in alleviating the sharp differentials in income in the country (Leite et al., 2006). 
 
Most of the earlier studies on economic inequality in South Africa have used the data on household 
income and expenditure provided by the 1995 and 2000 rounds of the Income and Expenditure Survey 
(IES). Some complementary sources of information have been have been deployed to overcome the 
limitations of the IES. By reviewing this literature (e.g., Lam and Liedbrandt, 2004; Liebbrandt, Levinsohn 
& McCrany, 2005; Bhorat & Kanbur, 2005; Hoogenveen & Ozler, 2006), one can highlight some of the 
major causes of the increase in inequality and poverty on which there is general agreement:  
 • Decline in income (mostly earnings) towards the bottom of the distribution; 
 • Labour market changes showing a drift towards a skill-biased labour demand; 
 • Increase in unemployment; 
 • Rise in rural-to-urban migration; and  
 • Negative effects of macroeconomic policies. 
 
A brief review of the literature on income inequality in South Africa suggests that the changes in the 
labour market that happened in the post-apartheid era were the major drivers of the dynamics of income 
distribution. This is not unexpected because throughout the world earnings are a major component of 
total income and South Africa is no exception to this rule. In 1994 the average per capita income among 
the black population was one-tenth that of the white population; among people aged fourteen years or 
more, 90 percent of the white population had passed at least standard six in school, compared with 46 
percent of the black population; among people aged eighteen years or more, 61 percent of the white 
population had passed at least matric, compared to just 11 percent of the black population; 36 percent of 
black households and 0 percent of the white population lived in shacks, traditional huts, or hostels; only 
18 percent of black households had internal piped water, and only 37 percent had electricity  - compared  
to 100 percent of white households (Nattrass & Seekings, 2001; Liebbrandt, Levisohn & McCrany, 2005). 
Predictably, given South Africa’s history, there is still a strong correlation between race and household 
income. According to Seekings & Nattrass (2005) nine out of ten households in the bottom six deciles (the 
poorest 60 percent of the households) were black in 1993. By contrast, three-quarters of the top decile 
were white. This is an unmistakable evidence of interracial inequality. Rising income among better-off 
black households has enlarged intraracial inequality as well as reduced interracial inequality. By 2004, 
the average household income in the richest tenth of the black households was over two hundred and 
fifty times higher than the average income in the poorest tenth (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2005; Hoogenveen 
and Ozler, 2006). The richest tenth alone earned about one-sixth of the total national income, which is 
more than combined share of other nine-tenths of black households together (and about the same share 
as the top tenth of the white population) (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005; Leite et al., 2006). There are very 
few countries in the world where income inequality is higher than it is among the black population in 
South Africa. Whiteford & van Seventer (2000) estimate that the “within-group” inequality now accounts 
for over two-thirds of total inequality, whereas it only accounted for 38 percent in 1975. 
 
According to Statistics South Africa (2014) poverty levels have declined since 2006, reaching a low of 45, 
5% in 2011. This turns out into approximately 23 million people living below the poverty line. The 
number of people living below the poverty line increased to 15, 8 million in 2009 from 12, 6 million in 
2006, before dropping to 10, 2 million people in 2011. This was motivated by a number of reasons such as 
the growing social safety net, income growth, above inflation wage increases, slowing inflationary 
pressures and an expansion of credit. However, while the poverty situation is improving, inequality in our 
society remains a serious concern. The Gini index is calculated to be roughly 0, 65 based on expenditure 
data (per capita excluding taxes) and 0, 69 based on income data (per capita including salaries, wages and 
693 
 
social grants) in 2011. The share of national consumption between the richest and poorest remains very 
consistent. The richest 20% of the population accounted for over 61% of consumption in 2011, down 
from 64% recorded in 2006. In the meantime, the bottom 20% see their share remain fairly consistent at 
below 4, 5% (Statistics South Africa, 2014). 
 
3. The economic and political implications of inequality 
 
According to Alesina (1997) excessive inequality leads to social pressure for redistributive fiscal policies, 
socio-political instability, unsustainable policy choices, and, possibly, low growth. The linkage running 
from income distribution to policy choices and economic outcomes is “highly complex and variable across 
time and countries” (Sachs, 1989: 7). Some channels suggest an inverse relationship beginning from the 
initial income inequality to growth. A fiscal channel suggests that income inequality generates a demand 
for redistributive fiscal policy. In the median voter model, the main measure of inequality is the level of 
income of the median voter relative to the average. The poorer the median voter compared to the 
average, the greater the amount of redistribution that a majority of voters will support. Usually, a large, 
impoverished fraction of the population creates political pressure for redistributive policies. This 
pressure may take different forms in different institutional contexts but is usually felt in both 
democracies and dictatorships. In fact, in order to continue to stay on power, even dictators cannot 
completely ignore popular demands.  
 
Redistributive fiscal policies lead to high levels of taxation, which adversely affect economic growth. 
Hence, the chain of causation goes from high initial income inequality to high taxes, and from large 
redistribution to low growth. The other argument is that the rich in very unequal societies have the 
political and economic means to escape taxation by exiting the economy with capital flight or by tax 
evasion. Thus, the demand for redistributive policies together with a vanishing tax base may lead to huge 
budget deficits. Income inequality promotes social discontent and conflict. The related threats to property 
rights, policy volatility, and government fragility dampen productive investment, promote capital flight, 
and ultimately reduce growth. Alesina & Perotti (1996) and Perotti (1996) show that socio-political 
instability, measured by a composite index, increases with income inequality, and socio-political 
instability reduced private investment. An inverse relationship between political instability and growth is 
also recognized by Barro (1991) and Alesina, Ozler, Roubini & Swagel (1996). Since income inequality 
fosters socio-political instability, this suggests a linkage running from initial income inequality to 
macroeconomic imbalances. Alesina & Rodrik (1994) suggests that different levels of initial income 
inequality may assist in explaining the more efficacious experience of East Asian countries compared to 
Latin American countries in terms of growth and macroeconomic stability in the past three decades. In 
summary, the point is, in Sachs’s (1989: 7) words, “high income inequality…contributes to intense 
political pressure for macroeconomic policies to raise the incomes of the lower income groups, which in 
turn contributes to bad policy choices and weak economic performance”. The Latin American populism is 
a perfect example of this argument. 
 
Psacharopoulos et al. (1995) demonstrate that inequality in Latin America was, like poverty, anti-cyclical 
with growth. Ravallion & Chen (1997) in their 42 countries studies study find no evidence that aggregate 
income growth aided in reducing inequality. The role of inequality in indirectly reducing the benefits of 
growth for poverty alleviation is an important issue. Ravallion (1997) analyses 41 spells in 23 countries 
to demonstrate that a higher initial inequality lowers the income elasticity, thus also protecting the poor 
during recessions. He estimates a relation P = β(1− 𝐺˳)GDPpc,where P is the headcount ration, 𝐺˳ the 
initial inequality index, and β(1− 𝐺˳) the income elasticity of poverty, showing that inequality reduces 
the poverty reduction effects of GDPpc growth. With higher inequality, the poor receive a lower share not 
only of total income but also of its increases through growth. Psacharopoulos et al. (1995) also find that 
high inequality reduces the poverty reduction effect of aggregate income growth. And, more specifically, 
Birdsall & Londono (1997) demonstrate that it is land and educational inequality that lead to lowering 
the income growth of the poor. The proposition that initial inequality appeared to be linked with lower 
growth rates was put forward by Persson & Tabellini (1994) and Alesina & Rodrik (1994). Using data sets 
available to them, both studies discovered that inequality variables had considerably negative coefficients 
in growth regressions, when controlling for a number of the usual right-hand side variables, such as initial 
income, schooling and physical capital investment. A survey conducted by Benabou (1996) recorded a 
number of other cross-country empirical investigations of this relationship, and found that the vast 
majority of them arrived at the same conclusion. One of the channels through which inequality was 
suggested to affect growth depended profoundly on political economy aspects. The models suggested by 
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Alesina & Rodrik (1994) and Persson & Tabellini (1994) were evidently examples of this part of the 
literature. There is another channel, noted by Ferreira (1999), which postulates that productive 
opportunities might differ along the wealth distribution. It postulates that poor people may not have the 
same chances in life as richer people, and may thus never quite achieve their full productive potential. 
The reason may be that they do not get as good an education as those afforded by richer families, or 
because they can’t get loans to start up a business as easily, or because they can’t afford the insurance 
they would need to undertake some risky but productive undertaking. In this case, a distribution with lots 
of people, or unevenly distributed opportunities, would under-utilise its aggregate productive potential to 
a larger degree than a distribution with relatively less poor people, or one where opportunities were 
more fairly distributed. In other words, it would be less efficient and have a lesser production possibility 
set. 
 
The economic performance of South Africa since 1994: South Africa went through a significant change 
since the democratic transition in 1994, but economic growth and employment creation have been 
unsatisfactory. Most notably, unemployment is presently among the highest relative to other middle-
income countries. While the dominant cause of high unemployment may be that prevalent wages levels 
are too high, the greater cause lies elsewhere and is closely related to the inability of South Africa to 
produce much growth impetus in the past decade. The democratic transition generated expectations of a 
substantial improvement in the economic performance of the country. Sanctions and internal opposition 
to the apartheid regime had led to the humblest ten-year growth performance, from 1984 to 1993, since 
the end of World War II and the removal of these restrictions was generally expected to improve the 
economic performance of the country (Du Plessis & Smit, 2006). It can also be argued that rising 
prosperity was required to maintain the political transition. There has been an enhanced growth 
performance in South Africa since 1994, especially relative to the ten years before the political transition. 
Nonetheless, the improvement was small, both by international and the standards of South Africa’s own 
economic performance in the past. 
 
South Africa has exceptionally high level of inequality relative to other countries at similar levels of 
average per capita income. The  costs that inequality cause have been brought to the attention of the 
public by the hampering of economic recovery in part as a result of social exclusion, and by the pressures 
of social reaction as the distribution of the benefits from growth is judged to be excessively one-sided. 
The sensitivity of the public is aggravated by the fact that the grave losses in their purchasing power 
during the years of economic crisis and adjustments that had to be made have increased the impatience in 
sharing the benefits of growth and, as a result, leaving little space for further delay. Successful transition 
to democracy has given the marginalised new channels of access to the political process, and thereby 
making their demands for sharing the gains from growth more problematic to ignore. The power of these 
demands has been profoundly boosted by the rise of grassroots organisations and social movements 
which act as mouthpieces for the poor. In South Africa there are Abahlali Base Mjondolo and the Landless 
Peoples Movement that represent the squatters and the landless people respectively. The lessons learned  
from the East Asian experience (Stiglitz, 1996) and empirical studies of endogenous growth (Aghion & 
Howitt, 1998; Benabou, 1996) have made it widely well-known that income inequality can have a 
deleterious effect on income growth, thus opening to inquiry the economic sense of sustained high levels 
of inequality in South Africa. There is a prevalent recognition that the present levels of inequality in South 
Africa have to be reduced. The question of how effective will aggregate income growth is in reducing 
poverty and inequality is an essential matter for policy making. Can economic growth be relied upon to 
meaningfully reduce poverty and inequality or is it a tame force that needs to be accompanied by other 
policy interventions? This is the question that South Africa needs to deal with. Despite the overall 
perception that macroeconomic performance is closely related to poverty and inequality, there are very 
few quantitative estimates that are available in South Africa about the association of macroeconomic 
performance with income distribution. 
 
The political implications of inequality: Economic inequality is associated with social tension between 
classes, religions, regions, generations, and the sexes; between educational and occupational levels; and 
between linguistic, ethnic, and communal groups (Lichbach, 1989). Therefore, it is rational to assume that 
any income distribution within a society will tend to provoke discontent from groups that are dissatisfied 
with it. Particularly referring to the size distributions of collective consumption and private consumption, 
a low proportion of collective consumption to private consumption will distress sections with somewhat 
little private consumption and groups that, in principle, are in favour of either more collective 
consumption or a more equal distribution of total consumption. Sections that are dissatisfied with a 
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perceived distribution will indicate their dissatisfaction in order to engender a rectification. The type of 
indication will depend upon the particular distribution experienced. This connotes a hypothetical 
relationship between the level of political discordance and a correlated measure of inequality in the 
income distribution. 
 
Ad hoc arguments and evidence exists for all possible forms of correlation between economic inequality 
and political conflict. One of them is that economic inequality increases political dissent. The reasoning 
behind this argument is that with high inequality, (a) the poor are resentful, have nothing to lose, and 
hence see force as a recourse (e.g. political conflict) to achieve their demand for redistribution; (b) the 
rich are materialistic, have everything to lose, and have the means necessary to apply force (e.g. 
government suppression) to avoid catapulting to their redistributive demands; and (c) the middle class, 
which values property rights, is negligible (Russet, 1964; Tanter & Midlarsky, 1967; Prosterman, 1976; 
Nagel, 1976). Therefore, as inequality increases, the range of conflict participants, both rich and the poor, 
increases. Gurr (1968) has shown cross-nationally and Barrows (1976) has shown for Africa that 
economic discrimination is positively associated with strife. Muller (1985: 53) argues that “If the 
mobilisation of discontent is correlated with the extensiveness of inequality, such that when inequality is 
pervasive some mobilisation is almost bound to occur, then the relationship between inequality and 
political violence should be positive and curvilinear, i.e., positively accelerated”. This will have a tendency 
to motivate the widespread and irresistible uprising of emancipatory movements among the dissatisfied.  
 
The counterargument is that economic inequality decreases political dissent. The reasoning behind this 
argument is that a high level of inequality is associated with powerful elites. These “haves” will be eager 
and capable of using social, economic, and political power to repress, and hold down, political dissention. 
Moral outrage, in other words, is more likely to be suppressed than expressed. Another explanation for 
this position is found in the social comparison practices of human beings. As Samuel Johnson noted, 
quoted in Verba & Orren (1985: 21), “…it is better that some should be unhappy, than none should be 
happy, which would be the case in a general state of equality”. In other words, under the conditions of 
moderate inequality, some are unhappy but under perfect equality everyone is unhappy. According to 
Nisbet (1968) this argument was popular to the nineteenth-century conservative political thought. They 
held that equality leads to conflict as part of the general social dislocations produced by modern society. 
These two arguments, that political violence will occur most regularly at either extremely low or 
extremely high levels of inequality and least frequently at intermediate levels are summed up by two 
economists, Thomas Havrilesky and Manoucher Parvin. Havrilesky (1980: 371) argues that “It is 
reasonable to assume that a discordance-minimising distribution of income exists at some positive level 
of discordance and that a perceived change in the distribution away from this minimum toward either of 
the extremes of equality or inequality will generate increased discordance”. Similarly, Parvin (1973:281) 
states that it is “…reasonable to assume that an optimum level of income inequality exists for any level of 
per capita income. Subsequently, beyond this optimum level, the net effect of further redistribution of 
income toward more or less equality may imply increasing, not decreasing, political unrest.” Kort (1952: 
491) also gave an explanation is support of this kind of relationship between inequality and political 
unrest. He contends that “When a critically high concentration of income prevails in a society, a revolution 
(i.e., disturbance initiated by the underprivileged majority) is likely to occur….when income is dispersed 
beyond a certain critical minimum of concentration a civil war (i.e., disturbance initiated by a privileged 
minority) is likely to take place. 
 
4. The political impact of inequality in post-apartheid South Africa 
 
Taking into consideration the two arguments above, the current situation in South Africa makes for an 
interesting analysis. With a Gini coefficient of around 0.65 percent in 2011 (Stats SA, 2014), South Africa 
is a highly polarised society. If one takes the first argument above, that economic inequality increases 
political dissent, one would have to agree that South Africa is ripe for political strife. Every day there are 
reports from all corners of the country for what are labelled “service delivery protests” and they usually 
take a violent form. The destruction of property such as public schools, clinics, road signage and 
municipal buildings usually accompanies such “protests”. In some cases, the response from government is 
also violent. However, the role of service delivery in the fermentation of these protests has so far not been 
studied thoroughly. Although several scholars, such as Habib (2010), Alexander (2010), Marais et 
al.,(2008), and , Booysen (2007, 2009) have attributed this protest wave in poor urban areas to failures in 
service delivery, the status of the service hypothesis as an explanatory variable for protests has, however, 
not been thoroughly studied empirically. Further studies need to be undertaken to understand the real 
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nature of such protests. The reason why such protests are accompanied by the destruction of property, if 
the communities are protesting for “services”, needs a thorough empirical investigation. 
 
Marais et al. (2008) and Atkinson (2007) have given some qualitative analyses on the causes of protests. 
Both studies reported that the deficient delivery of services is at the centre of protests in South Africa. 
However, Alexander (2010: 25) notes that most previous studies avoided explicitly studying the role of 
service delivery in these protests apart from making reference to such a relationship. Actually, Booysen 
(2007: 24) contends… “It is sometimes disputed whether there is a direct causal link between services 
deficits…and protests”. Can these protests be interpreted as a form of political “uprising” as a result of 
huge disparities of income that are prevalent in South Africa? Midlarsky & Roberts (1985) argue that high 
inequality leads to acute class polarisation which then tends to generate class-based, redistributive 
revolutionary movements. If this argument is correct then we should expect more protests in areas that 
are afflicted with huge disparities of income, even within a country. In South Africa the areas that exhibit 
high inequalities of income, such as Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Gauteng, are the one that are 
afflicted by what is termed “service delivery protests”. According to Municipal IQ (2013), an independent 
local government data and intelligence service, the province of Western Cape was the most afflicted by 
protests in 2012, trailed by the Eastern Cape and Gauteng provinces. Research by Municipal IQ using the 
Municipal Hotspots Monitor index shows strong evidence that most protests occur in informal settlements 
in the major metropolitan areas. Municipal IQ has been using Municipal Hotspots Monitor to identify 
where “service delivery protests” have been occurring since 2004. Figure 1 below shows that there has 
been a steady increase in “service delivery protests” between 2004 and 2012, with some years recording 
more protests than others. Only 10 protests were recorded in 2004 compared to 173 in 2012, and, 
therefore, 30% of protests were recorded in 2012 since 2004. Metropolitan areas such as Cape Town, 
Johannesburg, and Ekurhuleni have experienced an escalation of protests since 2004, along with other 
provinces like Mpumalanga and North West which have also recorded a high number on protests in 2012 
(see figure 2). 
 
Figure 1: Major Service Delivery protests (2004-2012) 
 
[Source: Municipal IQ, Municipal Hotspots Monitor 2013] 
 
Figure 2: Service Delivery Protests by region 2012 
 
[Source: Municipal IQ, Municipal Hotspots Monitor 2013] 
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If we take into consideration the large number of protests that have happened in recent years it is not 
surprising that there is an emergent discomfort amongst the members of the public about the reasons 
why such protests are happening and whether and where they will happen next. The rather ambiguous 
response by the government has not eased the public’s fears. In reality, the explanation behind such 
protests is mostly poorly understood and this has driven speculation on why these protests happen and 
whether they are even about the delivery of services. However, Parvin (1973) warns us that there is a 
strong statistical relationship between high levels of inequality and protests. Midlarsky & Roberts (1985) 
argue that such conditions may lead to the rising and formation of radical class-based political 
movements that seek major changes in the structure of political authority and social system. The 
dismantling and reconstruction of state power would then be purpose of such “revolutionary” 
movements. Such conditions are also known to have given rise to political demagogues and opportunists 
who utilise people’s genuine grievances and needs to pursue their own narrow, selfish interests (Tanter & 
Midlarsky, 1967; Muller, 1985). But will these protests in South Africa escalate into an overthrow of the 
ruling elite by the marginalised? Is there formation of ‘radical’ political parties such as the Economic 
Freedom Fighters something to be read along the lines of Tanter and Midlarsky? Are the events that 
occurred in Marikana also to be read in the same lines? These are pertinent questions that need careful 
analysis. The fact is, the number of “service delivery protests” in South Africa has been escalating every 




Societies that have extreme inequalities have a tendency to develop larger populations that are excluded 
from opportunities privileged group/s enjoy – such as better education and access to financial resources 
– and, as a result, tend not to develop their full capabilities. Theory and empirical evidence point to the 
fact that these missing realisations of capabilities do not only concern those who are concerned equity for 
itself. They also distress overall economic potential of the society and, consequently, its aggregate output 
and economic growth. Inequality affects economic growth via its impact on distribution of income and 
political power. A society could descend into a vicious circle because of the collapse of social cohesion 
caused by extreme inequality that could also threaten democratic institutions. Extreme inequality could 
generate a lower level of democracy, policies that are geared towards rent-seeking and a greater 
likelihood of political conflict. Inequality can also diminish social capital, e.g., the level of mutual support 
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